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ABSTRACT
We report an experiment in which we varied the nature of the articulatory suppression task
being performed during a filled retention interval in serial recall. During the retention interval
participants performed one of three computer-paced colour naming tasks designed to
prevent subvocal rehearsal: A Stroop color-interference task with items presented at a rate of
one every 750 ms, and two color-consistent control tasks at a rate of either 750 ms or 500 ms
per item. Memory performance over a 12 s interval declined much more dramatically with
the Stroop task and the 500 ms control task than with the 750 ms control. There was no
difference between the Stroop condition and the 500 ms control. These results pose
problems for models that assume that loss of information from memory is determined
entirely by interference, as there are more interfering events in the control 500 ms condition
than the 750 ms Stroop. They also pose problems for models relying solely on time-based
decay and articulatory rehearsal because all three conditions should block rehearsal and
produce equivalent performance. The results illustrate that articulatory suppression tasks are
not all equivalent, and suggest that the rate of decay from short-term memory is strongly
influenced by the resource demands of concurrent processing
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When rehearsal is prevented, memory for as few as three
letters drops to chance over a period of about 20 s
(Brown, 1958; Peterson & Peterson, 1959). Why should
this be? The two most commonly offered interpretations
of this finding have been that memory undergoes a
time-based decay that can be prevented if the memory
trace is continually refreshed by rehearsal, or that events
taking place during the retention interval interfere with
the representations of items in memory. The question of
whether forgetting is best characterised as interference
or decay is still a matter of active debate (Barrouillet, Uit-
tenhove, Lucidi, & Langerock, 2017; Lewandowsky & Ober-
auer, 2015; Lucidi et al., 2016; Oberauer, Farrell, Jarrold, &
Lewandowsky, 2016; Ricker, Spiegel, & Cowan, 2014; Ver-
gauwe, Camos, & Barrouillet, 2014). Indeed, McGeoch’s
(1932) view that “There are no warmly discussed theories
of forgetting” might still be echoed today.
One of the main reasons for the intractability of the
question is that the main factors that have been proposed
to account for forgetting are generally highly correlated;
the passage of time, the unfolding of events, and the dur-
ation of processing. Here we examine forgetting specifi-
cally in the context of short-term verbal memory. We
report a simple experiment which poses a particular chal-
lenge to all current theories of forgetting from short-term
memory.
The most influential example of a theory of short-term
memory where forgetting is due to decay is the Working
Memory model of Baddeley and Hitch (Baddeley, 1986;
Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Their model assumes that forget-
ting is the result of decay, but the contents of memory can
be refreshed by sub-vocally rehearsing items using the
Articulatory Loop subsystem. According to this view, if
rehearsal is prevented by blocking the operation of the
loop, forgetting should occur. However, this simple story
requires extensive qualification. In particular, there is no
straightforward way to determine what kind of activity
will prevent rehearsal. For example, Vallar and Baddeley
(1982) found that whereas counting backwards in threes
seemed effective in blocking rehearsal, in that it lead to
rapid forgetting, simply repeating “the” produced hardly
any forgetting at all, even though one might expect con-
tinuous articulation to block the operation of the loop.
Although it is possible that counting backwards in threes
occupies the loop more fully than repeating “the”, it is
also possible that backwards counting is more deleterious
because it imposes a greater processing load. One of the
first indications that forgetting might depend on the
difficulty of the task performed during retention came
from Posner and Rossman (1965) who reported that forget-
ting was a function of the amount of information reduction
required by the task. Their results are consistent with
resource models of working memory where there is a
pool of resources that has to be shared between mainten-
ance and any processing operations carried out during the
maintenance period (e.g., Just & Carpenter, 1992; Ma,
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Husain, & Bays, 2014). However, others have suggested
instead that more demanding tasks take more time and
leave less time for maintenance processes. That is,
demanding tasks are not detrimental because of the load
they impose but because of the time they take. For
example, Towse, Hitch, and Hutton (2002) argued for a
simple task-switching model where resources could be
switched between the retention task and maintenance.
They assumed that forgetting was determined purely by
the amount of time taken up by the retention task, and
not by its difficulty. However, in their experiments, task
difficulty and duration were confounded. Furthermore,
the retention-interval tasks were all self-paced. Participants
may have adapted to the “harder” tasks by continuing to
use resources at the same rate, but for a longer period. Bar-
rouillet and colleagues (Barrouillet, Bernardin, & Camos,
2004; Barrouillet, Bernardin, Portrat, Vergauwe, & Camos,
2007) addressed some of these issues by using compu-
ter-paced secondary tasks. They argue that the impact of
having to perform a secondary task during retention is a
function of the duration of the task which competes for
time devoted to maintenance.
In common with Cowan and colleagues (e.g., Cowan,
1992) they suggest that maintenance of the memory
trace may not require the kind of explicit sequential rehear-
sal process envisaged in the Working Memory model.
Instead, there may be a rapid non-articulatory refreshing
process. The Barrouillet studies used variations on an oper-
ation span task in which the secondary task is interleaved
between presentations of successive items to be recalled.
In their studies the retention interval for the first item
can be up to one minute. In the Working Memory model,
retention over such long delays would be considered to
be served by the Episodic Buffer (2000) rather than the
short terms stores, and the necessary task switching
would require extensive coordination by the Central Execu-
tive. This makes it hard to compare their results with those
from more conventional simple-span serial recall tasks
where items have to be retained for only a few seconds.
Indeed, very little of the recent work on the nature of for-
getting has studied short-term verbal memory. For
example, the bulk of the work covered by Oberauer et al.
(2016) in their recent review used either visual working
memory tasks or complex span tasks.
Models incorporating interference can also explain why
memory declines during filled maintenance periods. In
these models, memory deteriorates as a function of the
number of interfering items incorporated into memory,
and not because of time-based decay. For example, Lewan-
dowsky and Oberauer (2015) have argued that not only is
there no decay in short-term memory, but also that articu-
latory rehearsal is no benefit. Their general line of reason-
ing is that rehearsal can introduce errors, and that every
rehearsal episode will therefore tend to introduce more
errors and make performance deteriorate. However, while
this may be a property of the specific implementation of
a decay model they chose to use (LTRS*, Oberauer &
Lewandowsky, 2011) this is not true of all decay models.
For example, Page and Norris (1998) incorporated rehearsal
into their Primacy model. In that model participants are
assumed to rehearse while they are still able to repeat
the items encountered so far in the interval between the
presentation of successive items. For example, they
might rehearse only up until the fourth item has been pre-
sented. The items up until that point will have undergone
very little decay and rehearsal will be completely accurate.
This is exactly the same process that enables short lists of
items to be retained indefinitely when participants are per-
mitted to rehearse. Of course, the same is not true when
lists exceed span. For example, an eight-item list is unlikely
to be recalled without error. Any attempt to repeatedly
rehearse entire eight-item lists is likely to lead to errors
that propagate and increase with successive rehearsals.
This process can be seen at work in the Hebb (1961) rep-
etition task. Kalm and Norris (2016) found that, as would
be expected, performance on immediate serial recall of
an eight-item list improved over successive repetitions,
but errors tended to be similar to errors in recall of previous
lists. That is, when there are errors in recall these do propa-
gate through subsequent recalls, even when participants
have the benefit of a repeated presentation of the list in
between.
There are thus several alternative accounts of why infor-
mation is lost from memory over time, and why that loss is
greater when participants engage in a task such as articu-
latory suppression during retention. According to the stan-
dard Working Memory account, loss of information from
STM is a consequence of decay which can be counteracted
by articulatory rehearsal. In resource models maintenance
depends on sharing a pool of resources between mainten-
ance and other processing requirements. In Barrouillet
et al.’s (2004, 2007) Time-Based Resource-Sharing (TBRS)
modelTBRS modelthe resource is not shared simul-
taneously, but switched rapidly between either mainten-
ance or processing. In TBRS the measure of resource
demands is processing time, Tasks are more resource
demanding to the extent to which they take more time
to process. Finally, in strict interference models, loss of
information is a function purely of the number of interfer-
ing events.
One task that has frequently been used to prevent
rehearsal during a retention interval is digit shadowing.
The rate of presentation of the digits has varied between
one every 400 ms (Bjork & Healy, 1974) to one every
750 ms (Norris, Baddeley, & Page, 2004). Subjectively at
least, digit shadowing, at even the 750 ms rate of presen-
tation, appears to prevent conscious sequential rehearsal
of the list items. Norris et al. reported that they had
never encountered a participant who claimed to be able
to rehearse while shadowing. A shadowing task where pro-
cessing load and number of potentially interfering items
could be manipulated without changing the fundamental
nature of the task would therefore provide an ideal way
of examining the effect of load on memory. Here we vary
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load using a Stroop colour naming task (Stroop, 1935). Par-
ticipants are presented with a series of colour names
printed in colour and the task is to name the ink colour.
In the “easy” color-consistent version of the task, the
colour word describes the colour of the ink. The “hard”
version of the task uses the standard Stroop manipulation
where the colour word corresponds to a different colour
from the ink (e.g., GREEN printed in red). The Stroop
manipulation ensures that the easy and hard conditions
are completely equated for the perceptual characteristics
of the input (coloured words) and the responses required.
Any differences between conditions are therefore unlikely
to be attributable to differential effects of interference. Bar-
rouillet, Portrat and Camos (2011) also used a Stroop task
as a distractor in one of their studies of working memory.
Performance in the Stroop condition was impaired relative
to a neutral control. However, this was a complex span task
where the retention interval for the first digit in a six item
sequence could be almost a minute. Each digit to be
remembered was followed by eight colour or neutral
words where participants had to read the colour of the
ink aloud. Each digit was presented at a slow rate (1.5 s fol-
lowed by a 0.5 s blank) and the coloured words were pre-
sented at a rate of one per second. Here we use a simple
serial recall task and track the effect of the Stroop distractor
from 0.5–12 s.
Preliminary investigations indicated that the fastest rate
that participants could reliably perform the colour naming
was about 750 ms in the Stroop condition and about
500 ms in the consistent condition. We therefore set the
standard presentation rate to be one item every 750 ms.
Although, given the reports from (Norris et al., 2004), we
were fairly confident that participants would not be able
to perform a full sequential rehearsal of the list items, in
the color-consistent condition it is conceivable that some
time might be available to perform a partial rehearsal. We
therefore also included a second control condition where
colours were presented at a rate of one every 500 ms. If
all three conditions are equally successful at preventing
rehearsal then, according to the Working Memory model,
the decline in memory performance over time will be the
same in all cases. However, according to an interference
account, memory should decline as a simple function of
the number of interfering items. Performance should there-
fore be equivalent in the Stroop 750 ms and the 750 ms
control conditions, but worse in the 500 ms control con-
dition. In contrast, if the Stroop condition is more resource
demanding, it should be harder than the 750 ms control,
possibly being equivalent to the 500 ms control. We also
included a manipulation of phonological confusability to
give an index of whether the letters were held in the pho-
nological store at the different retention intervals.
Experiment
Participants were 54 members of the Cognition and Brain
Sciences Unit volunteer panel aged between 16 and 25
years. There were equal numbers of males and females.
There were 18 participants in each of the Stroop and
750 ms and 500 ms control conditions
The Stroop condition and the 750 ms rate colour con-
sistent control conditions both had exactly the same
timing and differed only in terms of the colours the
words were printed in. On each trial participants heard a
list of four consonants presented over headphones at a
rate of one letter every 750 ms. The consonants were
spoken in a male voice, and had been edited so that
they sounded evenly paced no matter what order they
appeared in. In both the Stroop condition and the
750 ms color-consistent control, 750 ms after the onset of
the last consonant participants either saw the word
“recall”, or the word “loud” followed by three or fifteen
colour words, and then the word “recall”. The word
“loud” reminded participants to switch to reading the
colours aloud. When the word “recall” appeared, partici-
pants had to write the letter list in the correct order in
response boxes provided. All of the visual stimuli were pre-
sented for 650 ms with a 100 ms gap between them. This
timing arrangement meant that there were three retention
intervals of 0.75 s, 3 s, and 12 s. Trials with different reten-
tion intervals were randomly intermixed.
In the 500 ms rate color-consistent condition, all visual
stimuli were presented at a rate of one every 500 ms
(450 ms display plus 50 ms blank), and there were zero,
five, or 23 colour words, giving retention intervals of
500 ms, 3 s, and 12 s. All participants received 6 practice
trials followed by 144 experimental trials. There was a
short break half way through the experiment.
The colour words were randomly sampled from the set
RED, GREEN, YELLOW, BLUE, all presented in upper case.
The same word never appeared twice in succession. In
the color-consistent control condition, colour words were
displayed in the colour corresponding to the word. In the
Stroop condition, the word was always displayed in a
different colour. Words were presented in a 16 point bold
Arial font on a 19 inch CRT monitor.
The consonant lists were all constructed from the sets
ZJHR, PBLD and SXQF. The set ZJHR contains only phono-
logically non- confusable letters, whereas the other two
lists contain three confusable letters and one nonconfusa-
ble letter. Overall there were therefore equal numbers of
confusable and nonconfusable letters.
Results
Recall was scored in terms of number of items recalled in
the correct position. Recall scores are presented in
Table 1 and are plotted in Figure 1. The primary interest
here is in the comparison between the Stroop condition
and the 750 ms control. This was analyzed with a 2
(task) × 2 (confusability) × 3 (delay) × 4 (serial position)
repeated measures ANOVA. All reported effects are signifi-
cant at the .05 level. There was a main effect of task, F(1,34)
= 6.12, h2p = .154, delay, F(2,68) = 159.74, h2p = .825, with
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memory in the Stroop condition being worse than in the
consistent condition. Confusable items were recalled sig-
nificantly less accurately than nonconfusable items, F
(2,34) = 38.43, h2p = .531, and there was a main effect of
serial position F(3, 102) = 47.72, h2p = .584. The interaction
between task and delay was significant F(2,68) = 7.48,
h2p = .180, with the effects of task (Stroop vs. consistent)
being greater at longer delays. There was also an inter-
action between confusability and delay, F(2,204) = 15.82,
h2p = .318, reflecting the fact that the effects of phonologi-
cal confusability decreased over time, and confusability
and serial position, F(3,204) = 16.43, h2p = .326. Planned
comparisons showed that the effect of task was significant
at both the 3 s, F(1,34) = 4.245, h2p = .11, and 12 s delays, F
(1,34) = 10.276, h2p = .232, but not at the .75 s delay (F < 1).
A second analysis compared the 750 ms and 500 ms
control conditions. There were main effects of rate, F
(1,34) = 4.41, h2p = .115, delay, F(2,68) = 155.48, h2p = .821,
confusability, F(2,34) = 50.83,h2p = .599, and serial position,
F(3, 102) = 66.11, h2p = .660. There were also significant
two-way interactions between rate and delay, F(2,68) =
6.06, h2p = .151, confusability and delay, F(2,204) = 18.19,
h2p = .349, confusability and serial position F(3,204) =
17.47, h2p = .339, and delay and position, F(6,204) = 5.24,
h2p = .134. Additionally, there were significant three way
interactions between delay, confusability and serial pos-
ition, F(6.204) = 3.55, h2p = .094, and delay, rate, and serial
position F(6,204) = 3.40, h2p = .091. Planned comparisons
showed that the effect of task was significant at the 12 s
delay, F(1,34) = 6.605, h2p = .163, but not at 3 s, F(1,34) =
3.755, p = .061, h2p = .099.
The effect of phonological confusability was analyzed
separately for all three task conditions at all three delays.
For all conditions memory for confusable items was signifi-
cantly worse than for non-confusable items at the two
shorter delays but not at the 12 s delay (Stroop 750: F
(1,17) = 23.12, h2p = .576; 3 s F(1,17) = 14.62, h2p = .462;
12 s, F(1,17) < 1; Consistent 750: F(1,17) = 30.40,
h2p = .641; 3 s F(1,17) = 30.07, h2p = .639; 12 s, F(1,17) =
1.65; Consistent 500: 0.5 s, F(1,17) = 47.53, h2p = .737; 3 s F
(1,17) = 16.06, h2p = .486; 12 s, F(1,17) < 1). In a final analy-
sis comparing the Stroop condition and the 500 ms control
condition, there was no main effect of task (F < 1) and there
were no significant interactions involving task
Discussion
In discussing the idea of decay as represented by Thorn-
dike’s (1913) law of disuse, McGeoch (1932) pointed out
that “It is virtually impossible to vary the period of disuse
without varying also the number or kind, or both, of the
conditions or events which fill that period” (p. 361). The
Stroop task allows us to break the link between time and
number of events so as to directly contrast the effects of
Table 1. Mean proportion of items correct in position.
confusibility
Delay
Mean.75/.5 3 s 12 s
Stroop 750 ms nonconfusable .90 .67 .34 .64
confusable .77 .57 .33 .56
Consistent 750 ms nonconfusable .93 .81 .57 .77
confusable .81 .69 .53 .67
Consistent 500 ms nonconfusable .93 .70 .38 .67
confusable .78 .58 .38 .58
Figure 1. Mean proportion of items correct in position at different retention intervals for the Stroop condition presented at 750 ms, and for the consistent
condition at 750 ms and 500 ms rates. Error bars are ±1 standard error.
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interference and decay. We can examine memory over a
given period while varying the number of potentially inter-
fering items. In our experiment, all three conditions lead to
rapid forgetting over a 12 s delay. Importantly, forgetting
was far greater in both the Stroop condition and the
500 ms consistent condition than in the 750 ms consistent
condition. For the Stroop condition this was true even at
the 3 s retention interval. The first point these data make
is that the exact choice of task used in the retention inter-
val can have a dramatic effect on the rate of forgetting.
After 12 s, performance on the Stroop condition was at
only 61% of the level attained in the 750 ms control con-
dition. This is true despite the fact that, subjectively at
least, even the 750 ms control condition seems to allow
no time for conscious sequential rehearsal of the list
items. Second, the Stroop and the 750 ms color-consistent
conditions are precisely controlled for the representations
involved in performing the task. All that varies between
them is the pairing of colours and colour words. This
means that it is highly unlikely that the extra forgetting
observed in the Stroop condition can be attributed to
extra interference. These data seem to rule out both an
interference account and an account based purely on
decay that can be offset by articulatory rehearsal.
It might seem possible to rescue a pure interference
theory by arguing that each Stroop word has both an ink
colour and a colour name, whereas a color-consistent
word has only one colour. Perhaps the Stroop items
might need to be encoded using more features and this
might generate more interference? Such a view would
run into at least two problems. The first is that it is
unclear why features used to represent ink colour would
interfere with the representations of letters stored in
STM. How could the two representations overlap in such
a way that would produce interference? A second
problem is that color-consistent and inconsistent words
both have ink colours and colour names. The difference
is simply that in the inconsistent case they are different.
One would need to argue that the color-consistent words
create less interference because the colour representations
can be bound together in an amodal representation requir-
ing fewer features. The difference between the two
color-consistent conditions might be due to the extra inter-
ference created by having to name more colours in the
faster condition. However, if there is an interference
effect at work here, we would have expected to see it in
the contrast between Stroop and the 500 ms color-consist-
ent condition also. That is, both tasks should be equally
effective in preventing rehearsal, but there are more inter-
fering items in the 500 ms consistent condition than the
750 ms condition. If there is an interference effect, it is
swamped by the effect of the extra difficulty of the
Stroop task. Any attempt to argue that interference
might provide a complete account of these data must con-
front a major problem with a pure interference theory –
there are no a priori criteria for determining what counts
as a feature, or predicting which features should interfere
with each other. Indeed, even proponents of interference
theory have recently come to acknowledge that this is a
weakness of interference accounts and have considered
the possibility that interference might need to be sup-
plemented by resource limitations (Oberauer et al., 2016).
In order to account for these data in terms of decay and
articulatory rehearsal it would be necessary to assume that
when performing the 750 ms color-consistent task, there is
sufficient slack time available to perform at least some
rehearsal in the interval between colours. Although this
would seem to be implausible, it is impossible to rule out
without a categorical behavioural index of rehearsal. One
important fact to note here is that there was no significant
phonological similarity effect at the 12 s delay in any con-
dition. This implies that, by this time, the phonological
store was no longer playing any role in retention. If partici-
pants had been able to continue performing subvocal
rehearsal using the articulatory loop and phonological
store during the 12 s retention interval, information
would still have been retained in the phonological store,
and one would expect to see a phonological similarity
effect. Although this null effect cannot rule out the possi-
bility that there is some residual subvocal rehearsal, the
data provide no evidence that any rehearsal is actually
taking place within the phonological store.
The possibility that forgetting might be a consequence
of decay offset by rapid attentional refreshing rather than
articulatory rehearsal is certainly compatible with the
data. However, the data is not what would be expected
on the basis of previous estimates of the time taken to
refresh items in memory. In the TBRS model, rapid atten-
tional refreshing is assumed to take in the order of 50 ms
per item (Vergauwe et al., 2014). Therefore it should have
been possible to refresh our four-item lists in the 250 ms
of extra time available in the 750 ms controls relative to
the 500 ms controls. However, unless there is significant
forgetting during the 500 ms taken to process the colour
consistent word, there should have been no forgetting at
all in the 750 ms control condition as it should have been
possible to perform a complete refresh during every inter-
val between words. Of course, if our participants took sig-
nificantly more than 62.5 ms to refresh a single item,
then not all items could be refreshed and there would be
forgetting. The weakness of this account is that the rapid
attentional refresh process is even more invisible than
articulatory rehearsal. A similar problem arises with a
more general notion of resource where processes taking
the same amount of time might still vary in their resource
requirements. Once the linkage between resource and
time is broken, it becomes hard to predict which tasks
will demand more resources and lead to more forgetting.
However, while either the simple version of the Working
Memory model or some form of resource model could
perhaps be forced to accord with the data, the data pose
a more significant challenge to a pure interference
account. A successful interference model would need to
be able to specify which representations are stored in
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STM and how those representations might interfere with
each other.
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